Are there activities of the mind that cannot be represented by Turing machines?

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.25312/2083-2923.23_08mfo

Keywords:

computationalism, computational theory of mind, Gödelian argument, John Randolph Lucas, Roger Penrose, Turing machine, Kurt Gödel

Abstract

 The article is an attempt to answer the question whether we are able to identify such activities of the mind that are not possible to be represented by a Turing machine? Thus, it is a question of whether all our mental states have a computational nature. This problem will be considered in relation to the so-called Gödel argument, based on two Gödel theorems: 1. on incompleteness and 2. on the incompleteness of non-contradiction, directed against computational theories of mind. This argument, as presented by John Randolph Lucas, will be critically analyzed, which will lead to positive conclusions in the final part of the article.

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Author Biography

  • Marzena Fornal, University of Humanities and Economics in Łódź

    Marzena Fornal – doctor of humanities, graduate of philosophy at the University of Lodz. She specializes in the philosophy of mind, in particular in contemporary concepts arising from analytical philosophy, cognitive science and broadly understood neurosciences. She devoted special attention to the problem of consciousness, its ontic status, genesis, and the possibilities of its scientific cognition as well as psychophysical problem in theory of emergence. Participant of many conferences and author of publications in the field of philosophy of mind.

References

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Published

2023-09-11

Issue

Section

Artykuły

How to Cite

Are there activities of the mind that cannot be represented by Turing machines?. (2023). Kultura I Wychowanie, 1/23, 107-115. https://doi.org/10.25312/2083-2923.23_08mfo