ZARZĄDZANIE INNOWACYJNE W GOSPODARCE I BIZNESIE NR 1(42)/2026
e-ISSN 2391-5129
Damian Kociemba https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6604-858X Independent scholar
e-mail: kociemba.damian.kd@gmail.com
Paradygmat bezpieczeństwa w logistyce ogniw litowych i sodowych. Analiza porównawcza ryzyka thermal runaway, ewolucja przepisów ADR i rekomendacje operacyjne
https://doi.org/10.25312/ziwgib.866
Abstract
This article evaluates the adequacy of current transport reg-ulations (ADR) concerning the specific hazards posed by lithi-um-ion (LIB) and sodium-ion (SIB) technologies, and to formu-late new safety standards for the road transport of dangerous goods. The study employs a methodology based on a critical literature review in fire safety engineering and materials chem-istry, case study analysis of transport incidents, and a formal-le-gal analysis of international transport regulations. The analysis reveals that SIB technology does not eliminate the risk of ther-mal runaway. Despite the logistical advantage of transport in a deeply discharged state (0 V), sodium cells exhibit faster ini-tiation of self-heating processes and toxic gas emissions (SO2). Furthermore, it was determined that current ADR requirements, which rely on packaging classification, along with traditional firefighting methods, are insufficient against the autocatalytic nature of battery fires. In response to the identified regulatory gaps, an integrated operational safety model is proposed. It en-compasses prevention (mandatory SoC < 30% verification and a strict ban on co-loading batteries with Class 1.4S explosives),
monitoring (off-gas detection), and intervention (the Flood & Cool tactic). Shifting the safety paradigm from passive pack-aging assessment to proactive control of the cargo’s energetic state is essential for effective risk mitigation.
Streszczenie
Celem artykułu jest ocena adekwatności obecnych regulacji transportowych (ADR) wobec specyfiki zagrożeń stwarzanych przez technologie litowo-jonowe (LIB) i sodowo-jonowe (SIB) oraz sformułowanie nowych standardów bezpieczeństwa w dro-gowym przewozie towarów niebezpiecznych. Zastosowano metodykę opartą na krytycznym przeglądzie literatury z zakre-su inżynierii pożarowej i chemii materiałów, analizie studiów przypadków incydentów transportowych oraz analizie formalno-
-prawnej międzynarodowych przepisów przewozowych. Bada-nia wykazały, że technologia SIB nie eliminuje ryzyka uciecz-ki termicznej (thermal runaway). Mimo możliwości transportu w stanie głębokiego rozładowania (0 V), ogniwa sodowe charak-teryzują się szybszą inicjacją procesu samonagrzewania oraz emisją toksycznych gazów (SO2). Ustalono również, że obec-ne, opierające się na klasyfikacji opakowań wymogi ADR oraz tradycyjne metody gaśnicze są niewystarczające wobec auto-katalitycznego charakteru pożarów baterii. W odpowiedzi na zi-dentyfikowane luki regulacyjne zaproponowano zintegrowany model bezpieczeństwa operacyjnego. Obejmuje on prewencję (obligatoryjna weryfikacja SoC < 30% oraz bezwzględny zakaz wspólnego transportu baterii z materiałami wybuchowymi pod-klasy 1.4S), monitoring (detekcja gazów typu off-gas) oraz in-terwencję (taktyka Flood & Cool). Zmiana paradygmatu bezpie-czeństwa z biernej oceny opakowania na proaktywną kontrolę stanu energetycznego ładunku jest niezbędna dla skutecznej mitygacji ryzyka.
The energy transformation of the global economy, driven by the dynamic develop-ment of electromobility and Battery Energy Storage Systems (BESS), is redefining the structure of supply chains. Galvanic cells, once a niche cargo in the transport of dangerous goods, have now become one of the dominant logistical volumes. How-ever, this technological revolution brings a new spectrum of hazards that elude tra-
ditional risk assessment methods used within the framework of the Agreement con-cerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road (ADR).
The current safety paradigm in logistics has relied primarily on substance clas-sification and packaging selection. Yet, a series of catastrophic incidents in air and maritime transport, as well as failures of land-based infrastructure, have exposed the insufficiency of this approach in the face of the thermal runaway phenomenon. The specificity of battery fires – characterized by rapid kinetics, the emission of tox-ic gases, and the ability to self-sustain reactions without atmospheric oxygen – re-quires the implementation of new preventive and intervention strategies.
In terms of methodology, this study is based on a critical analysis of literature in the fields of fire safety engineering and materials chemistry, supplemented by case studies of selected disasters in air, sea, and land transport. Furthermore, a compar-ative analysis of the physicochemical properties of lithium and sodium cells was conducted, alongside a formal and legal analysis of current international regulations (ADR, IATA DGR). This article not only synthesizes the current state of knowl-edge but, above all, formulates original operational recommendations and proposals for changes in transport practice (de lege ferenda).
The increasing ubiquity of lithium-ion technologies in supply chains and consum-er applications generates new challenges for transport and storage safety. A review of recent incidents – ranging from aviation accidents to land-based infrastructure fires and maritime disasters – provides empirical evidence for the necessity of im-plementing appropriate preventive procedures. It is worth noting that, to date, no major large-scale failures involving sodium-ion cells have been recorded; however, this does not exempt the industry from a proactive and preventive approach to this emerging technology.
A critical example of risk in passenger transport is the incident involving an Air Busan Airbus A321, which occurred in January 2025 at Gimhae Airport in South Korea. The investigation revealed that the source of the fire, which led to the de-struction of part of the fuselage, was a portable power bank located in an overhead locker. The ignition was caused by damage to the internal insulation of a cell, lead-ing to a short circuit. This event became a direct catalyst for the revision of safety procedures by international carriers (e.g., Singapore Airlines, Thai Airways). South Korean authorities introduced a mandatory requirement for passengers to carry such devices on their person, aiming to enable faster detection of potential ignition and facilitate firefighting efforts, which are significantly more difficult in enclosed cargo or baggage spaces (Butler, 2025; Hogan, 2025).
The risk associated with Li-ion technology is not limited to aviation and also concerns land infrastructure. In April 2024, an explosion and fire occurred at a con-tainerized energy storage facility in Trzebinia, Poland. This event highlighted the dy-namics of thermal phenomena occurring within the cells, where a rapid temperature increase, exceeding the system’s heat dissipation capacity, leads to an uncontrollable chain reaction. This case underscores that Battery Energy Storage Systems (BESS) must be treated as high-explosion-risk facilities, and rescue procedures must account for the specific nature of chemical fires (Pożar kontenera z akumulatorami w Trze-bini, 2024).
The greatest scale of hazards is observed in maritime transport, where environ-mental factors (storms, salinity) and cargo securing errors can lead to catastrophic consequences. For instance, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) re-port regarding the fire on the Genius Star XI (December 2023, North Pacific) point-ed to a mechanical cause of ignition. Improper selection of securing equipment (un-dersized belt hooks relative to the lashing rings) led to their failure in harsh weather conditions. The unrestrained BESS units (weighing 9.5 tonnes each) suffered me-chanical deformation, which initiated a fire within the battery packs. Although car-bon dioxide-based fire suppression systems operate within a very limited range – as battery components can release oxygen for a self-sustaining combustion reaction, discussed later in this article – in this specific case, its application allowed for the sit-uation to be brought under control (Lithium-ion Battery Fires aboard Cargo Vessel Genius Star XI, 2024; Howard, 2025).
A starkly different outcome followed the June 2025 incident involving the car carrier Morning Midas. The fire, which broke out on a deck carrying approximate-ly 3,000 vehicles (including a significant number of electric and hybrid vehicles), proved impossible for the crew to contain. As a result of thermal damage and chal-lenging hydrometeorological conditions, the vessel sank in the Pacific. This case illustrates the limited capabilities of conventional firefighting systems when facing a fire involving a large number of electric vehicles on the high seas (Cargo ship car-rying new vehicles to Mexico sinks in the North Pacific weeks after catching fire, 2025; Hand, 2025).
The analysis of the above case studies – regardless of scale or location – points to a common failure mechanism: thermal runaway. This is an autocatalytic process in which an increase in cell temperature accelerates exothermic reactions, leading to further increases in temperature and pressure until the casing ruptures and ignition occurs. Understanding the thermodynamics of this phenomenon and the differenc-es in its progression for various cell chemistries is crucial for developing effective prevention methods and fire protection strategies. These incidents serve as a direct impetus for shaping international transport law and recommendations related to best transport practices.
Due to the complexity of multimodal regulations, further considerations in this article have been narrowed down to road transport, which constitutes a key link in the land supply chain. Contemporary logistics of energy materials is based on two key technological pillars: the widely used lithium and the increasingly important so-dium. To correctly interpret the ADR regulations governing the transport of danger-ous goods by road, one must first understand the fundamental distinction applied by the legislator – the division based on technology type (chemistry) and physical form (cell or battery).
The ADR Agreement precisely categorizes energy sources in Class 9 (miscel-laneous dangerous substances and articles), assigning them dedicated UN numbers:
Lithium technology: includes well-known entries such as lithium-ion batteries (UN 3480) and lithium-metal batteries (UN 3090);
Sodium technology (new regulations): in response to market innovations, new entries have been introduced: UN 3551 (sodium-ion batteries with organic electrolyte) and UN 3552 (sodium-ion batteries contained in equipment).
Although chemistry defines the UN number, it is the physical form that deter-mines the limits for utilizing exemptions from the regulations (e.g., the popular Spe-cial Provision 188). The ADR Agreement introduces a clear energy threshold (3.3.1):
Cell: the basic electrochemical unit. Due to the lack of external protection (such as a BMS – Battery Management System), limits for individual cells are more restrictive. Partial exemption (SP 188) applies only to cells with an ener-gy rating not exceeding 20 Wh;
Battery: understood as a set of cells electrically connected. Since finished bat-teries typically possess a more robust casing and protective circuitry, the limit for them is higher, at 100 Wh.
This principle applies to both lithium and sodium technologies. Exceeding these values necessitates the application of full ADR procedures. Regardless of whether a single cell or a complex battery is being transported, the possibility of admission for transport is conditional upon successfully passing the tests described in the Man-ual of Tests and Criteria (Part III, subsection 38.3). Additionally, manufacturers of cells and batteries are obliged to implement a quality management program, aimed at eliminating manufacturing defects before the product enters the supply chain.
End-of-life cells pose a particular challenge in transport. The ADR Agreement provides for specific scenarios regulated by Special Provisions (3.3.1):
Damaged/Defective (SP 376): If a battery is damaged or defective (e.g., cracked casing, leaks), it must be transported under special conditions. A crit-ical assessment is required to determine if the damage is critical (risking rapid disassembly or fire). Packaging for such batteries must bear a clear marking indicating a damaged/defective lithium-ion or sodium-ion battery;
Recycling (SP 377): Cells transported for disposal are subject to Special Pro-vision 377. This allows for transport in collective packaging, provided they are durably marked with an inscription indicating they are for recycling.
It is worth noting that in the case of sodium-ion batteries transported as waste or for recycling, a total exemption from ADR regulations is possible, provided they are in a completely discharged state (no electrical energy), which constitutes a signifi-cant logistical advantage over lithium technology.
Understanding these regulations, however, requires a deeper look into the nature of the cargo itself. Why are regulations evolving towards the inclusion of sodium, and how does it differ from the dominant lithium from a physicochemical perspective?
Over the last few decades, lithium-ion batteries (LIB) have become the undisputed kings of the market, powering everything from smartphones to electric vehicles and energy storage systems (Kamble, Walvekar, 2023: 1). Their dominance stems from high energy density and long cycle life, which have made them the standard in con-sumer electronics and electromobility (Farhan et al., 2025: 189).
However, the success of lithium has become its own problem. This element is relatively rare in the Earth’s crust (accounting for only about 0.0065%), and its re-sources are unevenly distributed geographically (mainly South America, Australia, and China) (Hua, 2023: 234). This leads to geopolitical risks, price volatility, and environmental issues associated with its extraction (Farhan et al., 2025: 189).
These phenomena have led to the search for alternative elements that could serve as a sustainable successor to lithium. Attention has focused on sodium (Na). It is the sixth most abundant element in the Earth’s crust (approx. 2.73%), and its resourc-es – unlike lithium – are virtually unlimited and widely available, for instance in sea-water (Hua, 2023: 234; Farhan et al., 2025: 189). It is this abundance of raw material and the potential for lower production costs that make sodium-ion (SIB) technology perceived as a key complement, and in some areas a successor, to lithium technology (Kamble, Walvekar, 2023: 1).
Although lithium and sodium belong to the same group of alkali metals and ex-hibit similar chemical properties, they differ in a crucial aspect – size and mass. Lith-ium ions (Li+) are small and light. Sodium ions (Na+) are significantly larger and heavier (Farhan et al., 2025: 190). This physical difference is fundamental to battery parameters – lithium has a more negative redox potential (-3.04 V) compared to sodi-um (-2.71 V). This means that lithium batteries naturally offer higher cell voltage and higher energy density, which is crucial in mobile applications where every minute of device operation counts (Farhan et al., 2025: 190). Despite the differences in ion size, both technologies operate on the same “rocking chair” principle. Ions move be-
tween the cathode and the anode through the electrolyte, “rocking” back and forth during charge and discharge cycles (Hua, 2023: 233).
Sodium technology introduces a significant innovation in cell construction that translates into costs and ecology. In lithium batteries, the anode (most often graph-ite) requires the use of a copper current collector because lithium reacts with cheaper aluminum (these are not dangerous reactions; they merely lead to the formation of in-termetallic compounds). In the case of sodium batteries, this problem does not oc-cur – sodium does not alloy with aluminum. This makes it possible to use aluminum foil of appropriate chemical purity instead of expensive and heavy copper on both the cathode and the anode (Hua, 2023: 237; Farhan et al., 2025: 190).
The elimination of copper not only lowers costs but also reduces the negative environmental impact of battery production, as copper is one of the materials with the highest potential for environmental damage in Life Cycle Assessments (LCA) (Degen, Mitterfellner, Kampker, 2025: 124). It is also worth noting the difference in anode material. While graphite is the standard for lithium, “hard carbon” is used for sodium ions (which are too large to efficiently intercalate into graphite structures) (Rehm et al., 2025: 2).
In terms of performance parameters, both technologies have their strengths and weaknesses:
Energy density: lithium cells still lead. However, the latest sodium cells (e.g., from CATL) already achieve energy densities of around 160 Wh/kg, which is significantly better than lead-acid batteries and close to older generations of lithium cells (Hua, 2023: 236);
Temperature behavior: sodium batteries show promising performance across a wide temperature range (-40°C to 80°C) (Hua, 2023: 236). However, it should be noted that at very low temperatures and low states of charge (SOC
< 30%), their internal resistance increases significantly, which may limit their energy efficiency in specific conditions (Rehm et al., 2025: 7);
Transport and storage: a unique advantage of sodium batteries is the possi-bility of discharging them completely to 0 V for transport. This is impossible for lithium batteries (which would most likely be damaged by such action) and constitutes a huge asset from the perspective of logistical safety (Rehm et al., 2025: 2).
In summary, it can be stated that sodium batteries are seen as a safer and cheap-er alternative to lithium technology, especially in stationary applications where battery weight is not critical (Kamble, Walvekar, 2023: 3). However, although so-dium technology is characterized by higher thermal stability compared to lithium (Kamble, Walvekar, 2023: 3), it is not entirely free from risks. In the case of both lithium and sodium cells, extreme operating conditions, mechanical damage, or errors in charging management can lead to one of the most dangerous phenomena in the transport of dangerous goods – thermal runaway. This mechanism, common
to both technologies, requires detailed discussion, as its progression determines fire-fighting strategies and emergency procedures.
In the world of hazardous materials logistics, the term that raises the most concern is “thermal runaway”. This phenomenon is the primary reason why lithium batteries (and recently also sodium batteries) are subject to such strict supervision under dan-gerous goods regulations.
Thermal runaway is a self-accelerating exothermic process. In simple terms: an in-crease in temperature inside the cell initiates chemical reactions that generate even more heat. This heat accelerates the reactions, leading to an avalanche-like increase in temperature, resulting in fire, the emission of toxic gases, or an explosion. This pro-cess typically occurs in three increasingly dramatic stages (Boozula et al., 2025: 3):
Although both technology types (lithium and sodium) exhibit a similar ignition mechanism, the cell chemistry itself is crucial to the course of the disaster. Compara-tive studies bring fascinating and sometimes counterintuitive conclusions.
In the world of lithium batteries, there are two safety poles. The first is LFP (LiFePO4), which is considered a “safe haven”. Research shows that even with high heating power (500~W), LFP cells rarely undergo spontaneous ignition without an external fire source, and their maximum temperature during failure is approxi-mately 478°C (Li et al., 2025: 851). Furthermore, LFP has the highest self-heating onset temperature (approx. 124°C), which means it is the most difficult to “trigger” the process associated with uncontrolled degradation leading to catastrophic conse-quences (Boozula et al., 2025: 6). The second is NCM (Nickel-Cobalt-Manganese), which is considered a higher-risk technology. These cells can reach temperatures of around 871°C and are prone to rapid ignition (jet fire) even without an external spark (Li et al. 2025: 851).
Regarding sodium technology, it ranks exactly in the middle. In calorimetric tests, sodium cells (with layered cathodes) reached maximum temperatures of around 794°C – significantly more than the safe LFP, but still less than the extreme NCM (Li et al. 2025: 851).
However, it is worth noting that despite sodium being recognized as a safer raw material, sodium cells begin the self-heating process much faster than lithium cells – at just 94°C (compared to 124°C for LFP) (Boozula et al., 2025: 6). This results from the lower stability of the SEI layer on hard carbon anodes, which begins to degrade at lower temperatures (Boozula et al., 2025: 14).
An extremely interesting phenomenon observed in sodium batteries is their fire specificity. During tests at high heating power (500~W), sodium cells generated a rapid stream of gases and flames (jet fire), similar to lithium NCM. However, due to the very high rate of gas production, the gas stream was capable of “blowing out” the flame, leading to a self-extinguishing phenomenon after just a few seconds (Li et al., 2025: 844). This does not mean they are entirely safe – the emission of toxic gases is still im-mense – but the risk of open fire spreading may be different than in the case of lithium. In the context of urban fleets (e-bikes, scooters), the problem is not just a sin-
gle cell, but their dense packing in a battery module. The phenomenon of thermal propagation (fire spreading from cell to cell) is crucial here. Research indicates that in densely packed e-bike batteries, the thermal runaway of one cell almost guarantees a chain reaction (Kociemba, 2025: 124).
Therefore, from the perspective of ADR regulations (including Special Provi-sion 376 for damaged batteries), the key is not only “what is inside” (lithium or sodi-um) but how the battery behaves as a whole. Although sodium offers hope for safer transport (e.g., the possibility of transport in a state of deep discharge to 0~V, which eliminates electrical energy as an ignition source), the lower thermal stability of its anode requires special attention in the design of packaging and emergency proce-dures (Boozula et al., 2025: 23).
To summarize the argument so far, sodium is not a “non-flammable alternative” to lithium. It is a technology with a different risk profile – less explosive than lithium NCM, but more sensitive to thermal initiation than lithium LFP.
Analysis of the subject literature and fire suppression test reports necessitates a re-definition of the safety approach in road battery transport. Current procedures, often based on standard extinguishing agents and general ADR regulations, may prove in-sufficient given the specifics of thermal runaway. The following presents an integrat-ed operational model based on findings from research on extinguishing agent effec-tiveness and aviation-based prevention.
Although road regulations (ADR) are less restrictive regarding the state of charge than aviation ones, empirical data are unequivocal: the energy stored in a cell is the fuel for thermal runaway. In this regard, the International Air Transport Associa-tion (IATA) has introduced a strict State of Charge (SoC) limit of a maximum of 30% for the transport of lithium-ion and sodium-ion batteries. It has been proven that cells with a reduced charge are significantly less prone to uncontrolled temperature in-creases (Battery Guidance Document Transport of Lithium Metal, Lithium Ion and Sodium Ion Batteries Revised for the 2025 Regulations, 2025: 13). Furthermore, as previously mentioned, sodium-ion batteries possess a unique advantage – they can be transported in a state of total discharge (0 V) without the risk of chemical deg-radation, which eliminates electrical risk (Battery Guidance Document…, 2025: 4).
The second area considered by the author is extinguishing agents. A key con-clusion from the literature devoted to the analysis of fire tests is that traditional sup-pression methods, based on cutting off the oxygen supply (powders, inert gases), are ineffective against thermal runaway because this process is self-sustaining and does not require atmospheric oxygen for propagation. FAA (Federal Aviation Adminis-tration) studies and experiments on BESS systems have shown that the key to stop-ping propagation is a drastic reduction in the temperature of adjacent cells. Gaseous agents (such as Halon, Novec 1230, or CO2) effectively extinguish visible flames but lack sufficient heat capacity to cool the cells, leading to their reignition (Maloney, 2014: 14; Mrozik et al., 2026: 22). The most readily available agent supporting heat exchange and cooling is water, and in particular, water mist and encapsulator agents, which have shown the highest effectiveness, extending thermal runaway propagation time by nearly 180% compared to no intervention (Mrozik et al., 2026: 1).
The third area the author decided to address is toxicity and vapor clouds. Ex-tinguishing a battery fire is not only a struggle with temperature but also chemical emission management. The literature indicates a strong correlation between cooling effectiveness and vapor cloud production. Effectively extinguishing the flame while the internal cell reaction continues leads to the emission of vast quantities of flam-mable and toxic gases, which creates a real risk of a vapor cloud explosion in the en-closed cargo space of a semi-trailer (Mrozik et al., 2026: 21). Regarding toxins, al-though the electrolytes in lithium and sodium technologies are similar (carbonates),
the combustion of sodium electrolytes (particularly those based on the NaPF6 salt) generates significantly less hydrogen fluoride (HF) compared to their lithium coun-terparts (LiPF6). However, the use of the NaFSI salt in sodium batteries is associated with the emission of irritating sulphur dioxide (SO2) (Bhutia et al., 2024: 7).
Based on the preceding analysis of source materials, the implementation of an inte-grated safety model for the road transport of batteries is proposed, built upon three pillars:
SoC Verification: the introduction of a mandatory annotation in transport doc-umentation regarding the battery’s state of charge, which would allow emergency services to more rapidly assess the load’s energy potential (a practice already es-tablished in air transport; see: Battery Guidance Document Transport of Lithium Metal, Lithium Ion and Sodium Ion Batteries Revised for the 2025 Regulations…, 2025: 13). It is essential that this annotation does not compromise the legibility of in-formation required by the ADR Agreement concerning the sequence of information related to the description of the transported cargo;
Chemical Segregation: an absolute prohibition on packing batteries in a single outer packaging (as well as loading onto the same vehicle without physical separa-tion) with explosives, flammable gases, or oxidizers. In the event of thermal runaway, the proximity of these materials leads to a catastrophe that is impossible to manage using conventional means. It should be critically noted that current ADR Agree-ment regulations (2025–2027 version, table 7.5.2.1) permit the co-loading of Class 9 goods (including batteries) with Class 1 explosives – specifically subclass 1.4S. This group includes, among others, small arms ammunition, cartridges for power devices, and signalling pyrotechnics. In light of the temperatures generated by thermal run-away, considering these loads as safe neighbours for batteries is an assumption that is, at the very least, debatable.
Early Detection: in the case of transporting large units (e.g., BESS contain-ers), the installation of sensors in the cargo space capable of detecting not only smoke but also specific “off-gases” (e.g., CO, H2, light hydrocarbons) that appear prior to the outbreak of fire (Bhutia et al., 2024: 6);
Cargo Stabilization: the use of certified stowage and lashing methods that prevent mechanical damage to the cells (shocks, crushing), which are among the primary causes of internal short-circuit initiation.
The “Flood & Cool” Tactic: if circumstances permit, the priority of the fire-fighting operation should be massive heat removal using water or firefight-ing foam, rather than attempting to “smother” the fire with gaseous or powder agents. In the absence of the possibility to use water or foam, the focus should shift to protecting the surroundings (evacuating the population or informing them of the necessity to seal windows and doors) and allowing the cells to un-dergo controlled burnout (Maloney, 2014: 14; Mrozik et. al., 2026: 25), while designating the impact zone described below;
HF/SO2 Impact Zone: in the event of controlled battery burnout, a safe zone must be designated, taking into account wind direction and the chemical specificity of the load. Information updates should be continuously relayed to the exposed nearby population. For Li-ion batteries, the primary toxic threat is hydrogen fluoride, whereas for Na-ion (containing FSI salt), it is sul-phur oxides.
The conducted analysis proves that in the face of increasing energy density in modern cells, road transport safety cannot rely solely on passive compliance with the mini-mum legal requirements of the ADR Agreement. The evolution of hazards – from classic fuel fires to self-sustaining exothermic reactions inside cells – forces a para-digm shift: from “safe packaging” to “the safe energetic state of the cargo”.
A comparison of lithium-ion and sodium-ion technologies leads to non-obvious conclusions. Although sodium cells offer a unique logistical advantage in the form of the possibility of transport in a state of deep discharge (0 V), their lower thermal stability of the anode and the specificity of toxic emissions (SO2) dictate caution and do not allow them to be treated as a completely safe technology. In both cases, the key risk factor remains the thermal runaway phenomenon, against which tradi-tional extinguishing agents often prove ineffective.
The safety framework proposed in the article, based on the pillars of prevention (SoC control), monitoring (off-gas detection), and conscious intervention (the “Flood & Cool” tactic), represents an attempt to address gaps in current procedures (particu-larly in the areas of prevention and monitoring). The implementation of these recom-mendations, specifically the voluntary limitation of the state of charge in road trans-port and the tightening of rules for the segregation of explosives, can significantly reduce the likelihood of a land-based catastrophe on a scale comparable to the dis-cussed maritime and aviation incidents.
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About the Author
O autorze
Współautor i autor kilkunastu publikacji naukowych i specjali-stycznych z zakresu logistyki, bezpieczeństwa i optymalizacji. Posiadacz świadectwa doradcy ds. bezpieczeństwa przewozu towarów niebezpiecznych w transporcie drogowym (ADR).
Ten utwór jest dostępny na licencji Creative Commons Uznanie autorstwa-Na tych samych warunkach 4.0 Międzynarodowe.