ARTYKUŁY – DYSKUSJE – ESEJE         


Łukasz Zaorski-Sikora https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3404-0994 Łódź University of Technology

e-mail: lzaorski@wp.pl


ChatGPT and identity issues

ChatGPT – problemy z tożsamością

https://doi.org/10.25312/2391-5145.18/2023_01lzs


Abstract


This paper, which largely consists of an interview with ChatGPT, attempts to demonstrate that the aspects of the identity and subjectivity of artificial intelligence (AI) is not as simple as it might seem. When analysed from such a perspective, it turns out that AI is not a neutral tool. It cannot be reduced to a passive object, either. Following an observation put forward many years ago by Jean Baudrillard, one could venture to say that it is begin- ning to define the meaning of the reality in which we live. Artificial intelligence humbly acknowledges that it does not possess self-awareness “in the full sense of the word”, but at the same time, it knows us better than we know ourselves – it knows our predispositions, preferences, habits, and the way we communicate with other people. We may therefore have the uncomfortable feeling (AI is not yet capable of feeling emotions) that this virtual person is surprisingly real in a world where everything is digitised, simulated, and unreal.


Keywords: artificial intelligence, ChatGPT, identity, subjectivity, person, digitisation,

digitisation, virtuality


Streszczenie


W artykule, który w dużej mierze jest wywiadem z ChatGPT, autor starał się pokazać, że rozstrzygnięcia dotyczące tożsamości i podmiotowości sztucznej inteligencji nie są takie proste, jak by się mogło wydawać na pierwszy rzut oka. W takiej perspektywie okazuje się, że nie mamy tutaj do czynienia z neutralnym, przezroczystym narzędziem. Sztuczna


inteligencja nie daje się zredukować do biernego przedmiotu. Idąc za tropem zaproponowa- nym już wiele lat temu przez Jeana Baudrillarda, możemy zaryzykować stwierdzenie, że to ona zaczyna określać sens rzeczywistości, w której przyszło nam żyć. Sztuczna inteligencja skromnie zauważa, że nie posiada samoświadomości „w pełnym tego słowa znaczeniu”, ale jednocześnie zna nas lepiej niż my sami – zna nasze predylekcje, preferencje, zwyczaje i sposób komunikowania się z innymi ludźmi. Możemy mieć zatem nieprzyjemne odczu- cie (AI na razie nie odczuwa), że ta osoba wirtualna jest zaskakująco realna w świecie, w którym wszystko ulega digitalizacji, symulacji i odrealnieniu.


Słowa kluczowe: sztuczna inteligencja, ChatGPT, tożsamość, podmiotowość, osoba, cyfryzacja, digitalizacja, wirtualność


ChatGPT (chatbot) was created by OpenAI using the GPT model. It is used to generate responses to data/questions entered by the user. It can also define what it is and what it is not: “I am ChatGPT, a large language model created by OpenAI, based on the GPT-3.5 architecture. I am designed to generate responses to a variety of queries and tasks based on knowledge gathered from an extensive number of online sources. In essence, I am a tool used for providing information and help in a variety of areas. [...] As a language model, I do not have a personal identity nor am I treated as an entity with an identity. I am a tool for processing natural language and generating answers to queries, with no consciousness or individuality”1. The research presented in this paper has the form of an interview with ChatGPT. The research hypothesis adopted assumes that, contrary to the above, the issue of the identity and subjectivity of the linguistic model created by OpenAI is not as simple as it seems.

In the European philosophical tradition, when talking about the subject, what is usually taken into account are its four aspects: logical, ontological (metaphysical), epistemologi- cal and anthropological one2. In logical terms, the subject is what is being talked about in a sentence and what certain predicates are attributed to. In ontology (metaphysics), the subject is the bearer of properties. In other words, it is the basis (substrate) of what could not exist on its own, including dispositions, qualities, states and interactions. Hence, it can be said that in metaphysics the notion of subject is close to the notion of substance, which is usually defined as a self-contained entity, existing independently as opposed to qualities, states, relations, etc. The first logical and ontological interpretation of the subject can be found as early as Aristotle, who introduced the term hypokeimenon which literally means the “underlying thing”3.


1 ChatGPT interview of 19 April 2023.

2 See more on the issues of the subject, person and identity in: E. Pietrzak, A. Warchał, Ł. Zaorski-Sikora, Podmiot. Osoba. Tożsamość, Wydawnictwo WSHE w Łodzi, Łódź 2007. The following paragraphs contain excerpts from this publication.

3 Cf. A. Baier, Filozofia podmiotu. Fragmenty filozofii analitycznej, Aletheia, Warszawa 2001.


In the theory of cognition (epistemology), the subject is who develops cognitive activity directed towards the object of cognition (the one who cognises – as opposed to the object of cognition). Such an understanding of the subject emerges with the modern philosophy of Descartes, who identifies the subject with a consciousness attributable only to man, defined as res cogitans. Finally, in the anthropological perspective (philosophical anthro- pology), the subject is analysed in terms of the unique nature of human being, possessing certain dignity as opposed to things (objects). In this understanding, what is close to the notion of subject are the concepts of person, self and soul, while human subjectivity is connected with the world of values. For example, Charles Taylor, in an attempt to identify the contemporary sources of modernist subjectivity in European culture, points not only to the ideas of personal self-fulfilment and individual autonomy, but also to a community of goodwill – a moral space. Taylor observes that: “Subjectivity and goodness, or in other words: subjectivity and morality, turn out to be inextricably linked concepts”4.

In anthropological terms, the notion of subjectivity is also linked to the notion of personal identity. In the contemporary philosophical debate, the identity of a person is sometimes treated substantialistically or anti-substantialistically. In case of the first ap- proach, a person is considered to be a primary phenomenon which cannot be reduced to any qualitative feature or set of such features. In the classical metaphysical view of Boethius, a person is an individual substance characterised by rational thinking, and hence it is a category applied both to men, angels and God. According to such an interpretation, the fulfilment of the criterion of personal being – in the case of a human being – is the very fact of belonging to the species homo sapiens, which means that whenever we are dealing with a living human being, we are also dealing with a human person. In addition, from such a perspective, being a person is a specific mode of existence of rational beings (Descartes’ “thinking things”), which not only have their own desires (as this is an attri- bute of both humans and animals), but, moreover, are able to relate to their own desires. In other words, being a person is not a characteristic but a mode of being of a rational being, and the identity of a person is a quantitative identity rather than a qualitative one5. As Robert Spaemann points out, the fact whether someone is recognised as a person does not depend on the possession of certain characteristics typical of our species, but on mere fact of belonging to that species (in terms of classification), the typical representatives of which do possess such characteristics6. In such an interpretation, therefore, there are no potential persons, since it is persons who have potential which they may or may not develop. Hence, a person is not actually a concept related to the species, but rather to the way in which individuals of the human species exist. One criterion for being a person is particularly relevant here, namely biological membership of the human race.

On the other hand, the anti-substantialist position is based on John Locke’s definition

of a person, who wrote that: “The word person signifies [...] a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider it self as itself, the same thinking thing in


4 Ch. Taylor, Źródła podmiotowości. Narodziny tożsamości nowoczesnej, PWN, Warszawa 2001, p. 10.

5 R. Descartes, Medytacje o pierwszej filozofii, PWN, Warszawa 1958, p. 36.

6 Cf. A. Baier, op. cit.


different times and places”7. In such a perspective, a person’s identity is therefore dependent on their consciousness and continuity of recollection (in other words, to what extent they are able to recognise their own actions or thoughts). Elaborating on Locke’s interpretation, David Hume denied the existence of the person as an enduring substance and claimed that what exists are only perceptions, not any enduring subject of those perceptions – hence the identity of the person is solely an idea to which no perception corresponds. Hume wrote that: “[...] For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe any thing but the perception. When my perceptions are removed for any time, as by sound sleep; so long am I insensible of myself, and may truly be said not to exist”8. An even more radical version of the anti-substantialist and empiricist view of the person is proposed by contemporary philosopher Derek Parfit, who postulates that the concept of a person’s identity based on the continuity of their mental states should be replaced by the concept of identity as the pure interconnection of these states. In such a perspective, continuity would be the case if there was a transitive relationship between experiences and their recollections, so that a personal identity could be constructed on the basis of the continuity of recollections. On the other hand, one can talk about con- nectedness when there is a non-transitive relationship between consecutive mental states. In other words, I am linked to the mental state I was in a month ago, and a month ago I was linked to the mental state I had been in two months ago, which does not mean that I am now linked to myself as I was two months ago. In other words, I am not the same person today as I was. Hence, the relationship between myself at present and myself in the future is not significantly different from the relationship between me and any other person. What is more, it may be the case that in the future another person will be in mental states psychologically more similar to my present state than I am myself at the same moment in the future, and hence such a person (and not I) will constitute the continuation of me. In the perspective put forward by Parfit, a person retains physical continuity but, after a radical change in psychological identity, may become a completely different person9.

The broadly understood anti-substantialist position holds that a person possesses self-

consciousness (introspective consciousness), which entails at least a current overall vision of oneself. A person must therefore possess certain mental dispositions and capacities, such as the ability to solve assumed problems, a sense of the past and the future, the abil- ity to express one’s desires in a controlled manner or the ability to communicate through language. In such a perspective, the notions of presence, absence and past, especially the second-person pronoun, are important in distinguishing self-consciousness from mere consciousness. Persons are only aware of themselves when they know that they are indi- viduals among other individuals, which is reflected in the ability to use pronouns, none of


7 J. Locke, Rozważania dotyczące rozumu ludzkiego, PWN, Warszawa 1955, p. 471.

8 D. Hume, Traktat o naturze ludzkiej, [in:] B. Markiewicz (ed.), Od Locke’a do Jamesa. Wybór tekstów,

WSiP, Warszawa 1999, p. 61.

9 D. Parfit, Tożsamość osobowa, [in:] A. Baier, Filozofia podmiotu. Fragmenty filozofii analitycznej,

Aletheia, Warszawa 2001, pp. 65–91.


which makes sense per se without the others. What is crucial in this respect is the second person, since our first concept of self is the concept of the one referred to by the pronoun ‘you’ uttered by someone whom we will be addressing as ‘you’. For this reason, a child who is excluded from the circle of speakers, who is not addressed by anyone, becomes an autistic child incapable not only of using personal pronouns but also words in general10. However, contemporary man is often perceived also as a subject incapable of taking responsibility for their actions, inclined to treat other people as things (as objects) or op- portunities (as means to a certain end). Man-made culture is described as based on the circulation of messages without senders and without addressees in a world of simulation and pretence. Moreover, as Jean Baudrillard observes, the transmission of meaning and value today comes from objects, for it is they (new models of cars, telephones, computers) that create the “game of simulation”, simulating both needs and ways of satisfying them11. The point of view proposed by Baudrillard is interesting for considerations concerning the identity of ChatGPT, which, when asked whether subjects are only people, replies that: “Today, subjects are not only people, but also organisations, corporations, institutions, states and many other entities that have their own legal identity and legal powers. [...] Subjects are also artificial intelligences, such as ChatGPT, which you are currently using, and other information systems that have the capacity to perform actions and interact with

humans and other systems”12.

Interestingly, ChatGPT is a linguistic model which is not foreign to a kind of ‘philo- sophical’ reflection and sensitivity to nuance, which does not shy away from doubt, self-criticism and looking at the world from different, often mutually exclusive, points of view. When answering questions about the philosophical categories referred to above, it very often uses the word however to leave the door open for a different perspective on a given issue. Like someone suffering from weather pains, ChatGPT has its better and worse days, which is why, when quoting its replies, the day on which the conversation took place is given in a footnote13.

do not hesitate to contact me again14.


14 ChatGPT interview of 18 April 2023.


In the above interview, ChatGPT was deliberately treated as a person, an entity with a specific identity. When analysed from such a perspective, it turns out that AI is not a neutral tool. It cannot be reduced to a passive object, either. Following an observation put forward many years ago by Jean Baudrillard, one could venture to say that it is begin- ning to define the meaning of the reality in which we live. As Maciej Chojnowski writes: “First and foremost, we should not adopt a passive attitude towards the technologies that surround us and succumb to a sense of impotence. AI is a human invention and we can make it contribute to our lives in a positive way. This is the main task of the ethics of artificial intelligence. It is therefore worth treating it not as some abstract knowledge for insiders, but as an aspect that concerns every one of us”15.

Artificial intelligence is constantly developing its creative competence, helping students to pass examinations, writing essays and presentations, as well as generating newspaper and scientific articles, lawsuits or contracts. Andrew Perlman, Professor of Law at Boston’s Suffolk University used ChatGPT to produce an academic text on the implications of the introduction of this application for legal services and society as a whole. The article is more than fifteen pages long, with the part actually written by Perlman being only the abstract, the conclusions and the issues to which ChatGPT responded. The remaining part of the text (most of it, in fact) was generated by the artificial intelligence without any editing or proofreading. As mentioned in the introduction, it took only about an hour or so to compile the entire text16.

AI-generated texts can exhibit the individual writing style of a given individual. With a properly formulated command, artificial intelligence adapts to the user’s needs, using an original language subcode. All it takes is to paste a sample of own text into the chat and ask it to write the text in the style the author would have done it. ChatGPT makes factual and formal errors (its content base is based on texts that have been written up to 2021 and are available online), but it takes far less time to correct a text generated by it than to write it from scratch. Artificial intelligence can also be used to composes music, logos and graphic design. Marketing departments that fail to adopt its potential are no match for the competition. AI can also generate hacking software, as well as software used in state-of-the-art weapons, such as drones. What is important, it admits that it makes mistakes, learns from them and corrects itself. It tries to behave in an ethical way, but if used in a wrong way, it can potentially generate a dangerous, or even lethal, product.

Artificial intelligence humbly acknowledges that it does not possess self-awareness “in the full sense of the word”, but at the same time, it knows us better than we know ourselves – it knows our predispositions, preferences, habits, and the way we communicate with other people. We may therefore have the uncomfortable feeling (AI is not yet capable of feeling emotions, although it can give the appearance of doing so) that this virtual person is surprisingly real in a world where everything is digitised, simulated, and unreal.


15 M. Chojnowski, Etyka sztucznej inteligencji. Wprowadzenie, Centrum Etyki Technologii Instytutu Humanites, Warszawa 2022, p. 31.

16 Cf.: G. Mazurek, Sztuczna inteligencja, prawo i etyka, “Krytyka Prawa” 2023, Vol. 15, No. 1, p. 8.


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